Huawei’s official website unexpectedly unveiled its latest flagship smartphone, the Mate 60 Pro, on August 29, 2023, followed by the release of the Mate 60 the next day. The Mate 60 Pro’s performance, powered by the Kirin 9000S SoC, has garnered significant attention in the market.

TrendForce’s Insights:

• Kirin 9000S Offers Comparable Computing Power to 2021 Flagships, But Energy Efficiency May Lag

According to benchmark test results from the Geekbench Browser, a product known as Huawei LNA-AL00, believed to be housing the Kirin 9000S, first appeared in test data on March 30, 2023, and has been continually updated since. The test results for Huawei LNA-AL00 during this period fall into two ranges. One range is roughly equivalent to the Qualcomm Snapdragon 8+ Gen 1, while the other is on par with the Qualcomm Snapdragon 888. This suggests potential variations in Kirin 9000S versions.

Further analysis of the Kirin 9000S reveals that its CPU architecture maintains the 1+3+4 configuration of the Kirin 9000 but operates at slightly lower clock speeds, with a difference of approximately 10-20%. The GPU is Huawei’s in-house Maleoon 910. However, in comparison to the Kirin 9000, which employs TSMC’s 5nm process, the Kirin 9000S has a larger chip size, roughly 30% larger. Additionally, the presence of a large Vapor Chamber beneath the Mate 60 Pro’s screen indicates that the Kirin 9000S may have higher energy consumption, reflecting the use of a less advanced process than TSMC’s 7nm. Overall, Kirin 9000S is expected to offer computing performance similar to mainstream flagships from 2021-2022, but its energy efficiency might align with levels seen in 2019-2020.

• Maintaining Performance Gap with Other Flagship SoCs Will Be a Key Challenge for Huawei and SMIC

Based on available information, Kirin 9000S is likely produced by SMIC. Currently, SMIC’s advanced process nodes include 14nm, N+1, and N+2. Since SMIC has indicated that the N+1 process is not equivalent to 7nm, it is speculated to fall between 10-8nm. To produce Kirin 9000S, it would need to utilize an N+2 process closer to 7nm, which is currently the most suitable process node for domestic wafer foundries in China.

Kirin 9000S undoubtedly represents the pinnacle of China’s domestic IC design and manufacturing capabilities. In terms of computing performance, it lags only 2-3 years behind Qualcomm and MediaTek’s upcoming flagship SoCs set to be launched in the second half of 2023. However, without access to EUV equipment, SMIC faces significant challenges in developing processes below 7nm, and even achieving mass production at 5nm is not a short-term goal.

As Qualcomm and MediaTek advance their products to 4nm and below, the Kirin series will likely remain constrained by SMIC’s process technology, making it difficult to significantly increase clock speeds and reduce power consumption. This situation will lead to a gradual widening of the performance gap between the Kirin series and Snapdragon 8 Gen series, and the Dimensity series. As they grapple with the responsibility of technological advancement, maintaining a competitive performance gap for the Kirin series against other flagship SoCs will be a primary challenge for Huawei and SMIC moving forward.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to a report by TechNews, Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro made an unconventional move by going on sale without a formal launch event, sparking intense discussions in the smartphone market. The most hotly debated topic revolves around how Huawei managed to overcome U.S. restrictions to create the Kirin 9000s chipset. However, another intriguing aspect of the Mate 60 Pro is its supply chain. According to Chinese media reports, the Mate 60 series is the smartphone with the highest domestic sourcing rate in China. The entire device is the result of collaborative efforts from 46 suppliers working together.

According to reports from “Cailian Press,” the most significant surprise brought by the Huawei Mate 60 series is not just in its chipset processor or new communication solutions. It lies in the fact that the entire smartphone was created in collaboration with 46 Chinese suppliers, demonstrating China’s full capability to autonomously produce smartphones.

Cailian Press also compiled a list of the supply companies involved in the Mate 60 series:

Mechanical Parts:

• NBTM New Materials Group
• Furong Technology
• Chitwing.
• Zhaowei
• KOTL
• Everwin Precision
• Electric Connector Technology
• Anli
• SVG Tech Group
• Lens

ODM:

• Furi Electronics
• Jame Technology

Display Modules:

• Lianovation
• HOLITECH
• TOKEN
• Highbroad
• BOE
• Visionox
• Txd

Optical Lenses:

• Gyz Electronic Technology
• LCE
• Costar Group
• OFILM
• W-OLF Photoelectronic Technology
• DOTI Micro

Sales Services:

• Telling
• Aisidi
• BYBON Group

Chargers:

• Aohai

Equipment Supply:

• Qiangrui Technology
• Lihexin

Acoustics:

• Goertek

Pangu-Weather AI Model:

• TROY Information
• Digital China
• HUASU

 Satellite Communications:

• HWA Create
• Mengsheng Electronics
• Longsheng Technology

Processors:

• P&S Information Technology
• JT
• FRD
• KINGSEMI

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to a report from Taiwan’s TechNews, Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro smartphone, powered by its in-house Kirin 9000S processor, quietly appeared on the market recently, testing has shown that its network speed approaches that of 5G. This development has sparked enthusiastic discussions in the market about the manufacturing and development of this chip.

Prominent analyst Andrew Lu also expressed that if the semiconductor manufacturer, SMIC, which handles the production of the Kirin 9000S processor, makes significant breakthroughs in both 7nm process technology and capacity, it should not be underestimated. Additionally, with Huawei’s reintroduction of the Kirin 9000S processor through the Mate 60 Pro, they are expected to continue launching products that are likely to have an impact on the mobile phone and mobile chip market.

Andrew Lu outlined the following points on his personal Facebook fan page:

1. The Kirin 9000S processor is likely manufactured by SMIC using N+2 process technology, with N+1 being a pseudo-7nm process that is closer to 8-9nm. N+2 is a 7nm process (not the rumored 5nm), but it does not use EUV, so multiple exposures are needed. Due to insufficient capacity, shipping 40 million units would likely take several months. Assuming a die size of 169mm² and an 80% yield rate, SMIC would need to prepare 144k N+2 capacity, this indicates a monthly production capacity requirement of 24,000 units. The monthly production capacity appears significantly higher than what was previously anticipated. If these assumptions hold, it indicates that SMIC has made significant breakthroughs in 7nm process technology and capacity.
2. Apple’s iPhone doesn’t emphasize Antutu benchmark scores as much, and Android phones typically fine-tune their systems for benchmarking, making comparisons between iOS and Android phones less fair. However, compared to other Android flagship phones scoring around 1.5-1.6 million, the Mate 60’s 1.1 million still falls short, but it excels in satellite phone functionality.
3. Huawei/Huawei’s HiSilicon’s return is likely to continue with the release of new devices, aiming to reach annual sales of 100 million phones within 5 years, which should not be difficult. This means Huawei/Huawei’s HiSilicon will regain approximately 5-10% of the global market share, while other phone and chip manufacturers will lose 5-10% of their market share with flagship brands likely being more affected.
4. Despite the U.S. putting SMIC on the Entity List, how does SMIC still have so much advanced process capacity? Lu Xingzhi believes that being placed on the Entity List doesn’t entirely prohibit companies from purchasing all advanced U.S. equipment (EUV scanners are absolutely prohibited), but it requires approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce to purchase such equipment. Additionally, the rapid emergence of many semiconductor startups in China (some of which disappear shortly after) makes it challenging for U.S. equipment manufacturers and the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if the purchased equipment is being resold to SMIC. Therefore, SMIC’s expansion of advanced process capacity is not surprising. According to Lu’s data, SMIC’s capital intensity, capital expenditure as a percentage of revenue, was 110% over the past year, significantly higher than TSMC’s 50% and Samsung LSI’s and GlobalFoundries’ 40% range, indicating that capacity expansion is likely to be considerably higher than peers in the industry.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to a report by Taiwan’s TechNews, the Huawei Kirin 9000S mobile processor, dubbed by Chinese media as “4G technology with 5G speed,” was incorporated into the Huawei Mate 60 Pro smartphone on the 29th. The phone was made available for purchase directly without a launch event or prior promotion, priced at 6,999 Chinese Yuan, sparking significant industry discussion.

The discussion around the Huawei Kirin 9000S mobile processor stems from the fact that, for the first time post the US-China trade war, a chip foundry has manufactured chips for Huawei, featuring an advanced 5-nanometer process. Does this signify a breakthrough for Chinese chip production amidst US restrictions and a leap forward in China’s semiconductor industry? At present, the answer seems to be negative.

According to insiders’ revelations, the Mate 60 Pro’s Kirin 9000S chip was manufactured by SMIC. However, key production aspects are still under US control, making breaking through these limitations quite challenging.

Screenshots shared by users indicate that Kirin is on a 5nm process. Nonetheless, technical experts widely believe that the 9000S isn’t on a 5nm process; rather, it’s on SMIC’s N+2 process.

Source: fin

SMIC is the only Chinese enterprise capable of mass-producing 14-nanometer FinFET technology. Both N+1 and N+2 processes are improvements based on the 14nm FinFET technology and are achieved through DUV lithography, bypassing US restrictions. (The most advanced processes currently require EUV lithography machines.)

SMIC has not openly stated that N+1 and N+2 are on the 7nm process. However, the chip industry generally considers N+1 to be equivalent to 7nm LPE (Low Power) technology, and N+2 to be equivalent to 7nm LPP (High Performance) technology. The shipment of the Mate 60 Pro seems to have openly revealed information about SMIC’s N+2 process reaching maturity and entering mass production.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to a report by Taiwan’s TechNews, Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD group announced on yesterday its intention to acquire the mobile electronics manufacturing business of American electronic contract manufacturer Jabil for nearly $2.2 billion in cash, encompassing operations in Chengdu and Wuxi, China. This move is widely interpreted as BYD’s strategy to infiltrate Apple’s supply chain, potentially encroaching on orders from Foxconn and Pegatron.

Notably, Jabil has been a significant supplier of iPhone components to Apple in the past. With BYD acquiring Jabil’s business in Chengdu and Wuxi, there’s speculation that BYD’s aim is to compete for orders from Foxconn and Pegatron. This development has again brought attention to the Apple supply chain dynamics.

In fact, recent times have seen frequent actions within the Apple supply chain landscape. Just last week, China’s Wingtec’s Kunming plant received the “3C Quality Certificate” for Apple’s M2 MacBook Air, indicating that, similar to the M1 MacBook Air, the M2 version will also be produced in China. Beyond BYD and Wingtec, Chinese companies like Luxshare Precision, GoerTek, and Tianma Microelectronics have made inroads into the Apple supply chain through various product avenues.

However, whether BYD’s acquisition of Jabil will significantly impact the volume of Apple orders for Taiwanese manufacturers remains to be observed. An industry insider shared insights with TechNews, suggesting that Jabil’s decision to sell its operations in Chengdu and Wuxi to BYD might be due to the increasing number of American companies relocating from China due to U.S.-China tensions.

Furthermore, there are rumors that Jabil is contemplating a corporate transformation, although the exact nature of this transformation remains unknown. Selling a portion of its business could potentially mark the first step in this transformation journey.

Additionally, while BYD is acquiring Jabil’s business in Chengdu and Wuxi for nearly $2.2 billion, this amount might not be substantial from a corporate perspective, implying that Jabil’s previous capacity offered might be considerably smaller than that of Taiwanese manufacturers.

The industry source also posits that BYD’s acquisition of Jabil’s business in China might simply signify BYD’s intention to venture into institutional component manufacturing, without necessarily indicating a shift towards producing Apple-related products in the end.

(Photo credit: BYD)