Apple has released its supply chain list for the 2023 fiscal year, with notable changes compared to the 2022 list. According to a report from CNA, Major IC substrate manufacturer Nan Ya PCB has returned to Apple’s supply chain list, while Nanya Technology, Lotes, Novatek are no longer included. TSMC, Foxconn, Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE), Pegatron, Compal, Wistron, and YAGEO remain part of Apple’s supply chain.

Apple’s 2023 fiscal year supply chain list covers approximately 98% of the materials, manufacturing, and assembly related to Apple products globally.

Compared to the 2022 supply chain list, for Foxconn, the updated list shows manufacturing locations for Apple products in Guangdong, Henan, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Zhejiang provinces in China, with the addition of Jiangxi while Hubei continues to be excluded. In other global regions, locations in Amazonas and Sao Paulo in Brazil, as well as California in the United States, are not included in the current list. However, locations in Tamil Nadu, India, and Bac Giang province, Vietnam, remain on the list.

For ASE, related locations include Jiangsu and Shanghai in China, Yamagata Prefecture in Japan, Taiwan, and Hai Phong City in Vietnam, with Gyeonggi-do in South Korea and Singapore continuing to be excluded.

Notably, companies including FPGA designer Lattice Semiconductor’s facility in Taiwan, Nanya’s facilities in Jiangsu and Taiwan, Lotes Terminal’s facility in Guangdong, Novatek Microelectronics and Taiwanese company Triotek Technology Incorporated are no longer parts of Apple’s supply chain for the fiscal year 2023.

On the other hand, major IC substrate manufacturer Nan Ya PCB, with facilities in Jiangsu, China, and Taiwan, has returned to Apple’s supply chain list. Golden Arrow Printing Company, with locations in Jiangsu, China, and Henan Province, Vietnam, is a new addition to Apple’s supply chain list.

Regarding Taiwanese companies that were first included in Apple’s supply chain list in 2022, including Platinum Optics Technology Incorporated, Primax Electronics Limited with locations in Guangdong, Radiant Opto-Electronics Corporation with locations in Guangdong and Jiangsu, Trinseo in Taiwan, and Winbond Electronics Corporation, these companies remain on Apple’s supply chain list for the 2023 fiscal year.

Furthermore, major Taiwanese companies such as TSMC, Catcher, Foxlink, Compal, Compeq, Delta Electronics, Largan Precision, Lite-On Technology Corporation, Pegatron, Shin Zu Shing, TXC Corporation, Unimicron Technology Corporation, Unitech, Wistron, and YAGEO continue to be included in Apple’s supply chain list.

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(Photo credit: Apple)

According to EnergyTrend, the New Energy Research Center under TrendForce, as of October 23, 2023, the prices for various photovoltaic materials and components have experienced changes:

For Polysilicon:

• Mono Recycled Polysilicon in RMB (Renminbi) dropped to RMB 72/KG, a decrease of 10%.
• Mono Grade Polysilicon in RMB decreased from RMB 78/KG to RMB 70/KG, a 10.26% decline.
• N-Type Polysilicon was quoted at RMB 78/KG, with a minor change of -15.22%.
• Polysilicon outside China was priced at US$20.55/KG.

For Wafer:

• M10 Mono Wafer in RMB were quoted at RMB 2.4/Pc, marking an 11.11% decrease; the latest pricing in USD was US$0.299/Pc, down by 11.01% from the previous US$0.336/Pc.
• G12 Mono Wafer in RMB were priced at RMB 3.4/Pc, showing a 5.56% decrease; the latest pricing in USD was US$0.422/Pc, a 5.59% drop.
• Since October 23rd, new N-Type M10 Mono Wafer was quoted at RMB 2.5/Pc.

For Cell:

• M10 Mono PERC Cell in RMB was priced at RMB 0.51/W, marking a 10.53% decrease; the USD pricing was US$0.065/W, down by 11.64% from the previous US$0.073/W.
• G12 Mono PERC Cell in RMB was quoted at RMB 0.53/W, representing a significant decrease of 10.17% from RMB 0.59/W; the latest USD price was US$0.067/W, showing an 11.84% decline.
• M10 TOPCon Cells in RMB decreased from RMB 0.6/W to RMB 0.52/W, down by 13.33%.

For Modules:

• The price for 182mm facial Mono PERC Module was RMB 1.15/W, a 4.17% reduction from the previous week.
• Both 210mm facial Mono PERC Module and 182mm facial Mono PERC Module were quoted at RMB 1.16/W, with a change of 4.13%.
• The price for 210mm facial Mono PERC Module was RMB 1.17/W.

PV Glass prices were reported as follows:

• 2.0mm Coating was priced at RMB 20/㎡.
• 3.2mm Coating was priced at RMB 28/㎡.

Please note that this information is sourced from EnergyTrend and should be credited if used or referenced.

A senior government official in Malaysia has stated that the country will prioritize attracting investments in high-tech industries such as semiconductor and electric vehicles to solidify its status as a manufacturing hub in Southeast Asia within the global supply chain.

Sikh Shamsul Ibrahim, the Senior Executive Director of the Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA), made this announcement during the Kuala Lumpur Economic Forum. He emphasized that in the face of ongoing trade wars and geopolitical tensions, Malaysia’s goal is to leverage the realignment and redistribution of global supply chains.

Ibrahim further stated that they are placing a strong emphasis on enhancing supply chain resilience and fostering closer collaborations with their trade partners. He also pointed out that they are actively exploring priority sectors with a particular focus on high-growth industries, including semiconductors, electric vehicles, and renewable energy.

In addition, Sikh Shamsul Ibrahim highlighted the government’s objective to introduce tiered corporate tax incentive measures, as per the 2024 budget plan, to attract investments in high-value and high-growth industries.

In September of this year, Malaysia unveiled a new industrial master plan that includes a $19.91 billion investment over seven years to advance its manufacturing capabilities. Key sectors in this initiative encompass electronics, chemicals, and electric vehicles, with the country also aiming to create 3.3 million new job opportunities.

(Image credit: Pixabay)

(AmCham Taiwan｜Associate Editor: Julia Bergström) As more countries look to diversify their supply chains, Taiwan has a chance to strengthen its position in the global economy. But is its infrastructure robust enough to support expanded business?

Over the past few years, the U.S. and Taiwan have intensified their efforts to reduce reliance on China in their supply chains as a way to increase resilience. First came the U.S.-China trade dispute, in which American companies were encouraged to leave or decrease operations in China, followed by the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s reshoring initiative to bring investment from China back to Taiwan.

At the onset of the global pandemic, the flow of critical products halted, global supply chains were disrupted, and supply chain resilience became a priority for all industries. Then, just as commerce began to bounce back, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine, giving rise to new worries of geopolitically induced shortages and inflationary effects.

Meanwhile, China is pushing to indigenize its supply chains, most notably with its Made in China 2025 plan, which aims to upgrade Chinese industries’ manufacturing capabilities into more technology-intensive powerhouses and achieve independence from foreign suppliers.

Although the U.S. and Taiwan are not decoupling from China, they have significantly changed the flow of goods and investments, says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, managing director of BowerGroupAsia, a consultancy.

“Instead of 10 dollars flowing into China, you’re seeing five going to China and the other five to the Southeast Asia region, or even Taiwan,” he says. However, there is no certainty that Taiwan will gain some of China’s lost business. Rather, achieving that goal will require significant policy changes and government efforts.

For Taiwan, strengthening its role in global supply chains is more than an effort to ensure economic stability – it also has political and security implications. Hammond-Chambers sees Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor industry in particular as a “geostrategic lever that focuses other countries on the importance of Taiwan and peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.”

Taiwan accounts for over 60% of the global chip foundry market, and the island plays a pivotal role in many high-tech industries, a trend expected to continue despite pushes from the U.S. and EU to revitalize their semiconductor industries.

In fact, says Joanne Chiao, senior analyst at Taiwanese market research firm TrendForce, her organization “expects Taiwan’s market share [in the chip foundry sector] will further increase to 66% in 2022,” as some of the newly added capacity will enter mass production by the end of 2022.

Although Taiwan leads in semiconductors, domestic expansion has its limits. During a discussion on Taiwan’s role in global supply chains organized by Washington, D.C.-based public policy organization The Brookings Institution, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) Vice President of Global Government Affairs Peter Cleveland noted that the company operates “at such a massive scale that it’s mind-blowing to people. [Production] takes over 4 million gallons of water per day, the power requirements are enormous, and STEM talent is critical.”

Cleveland said he sees geographic dispersion as an advantage for the company, and the expansion of Taiwan semiconductor operations in the U.S. as a way to strengthen supply chains while alleviating chip manufacturing’s strain on Taiwan’s resources. TSMC is constructing a US$12 billion fab in Phoenix, Arizona, which is scheduled to start producing chips in 2024. It is also building a plant in Japan and is in early discussions regarding a possible fab in Germany.

Apart from expanding manufacturing abroad, Taiwan also needs to implement policies that strengthen its infrastructure, according to BowerGroupAsia’s Hammond-Chambers. Of what has been termed the island’s “five shortages” (land, power, water, labor, and talent), he refers to labor, talent, and electricity as the most critical areas for government scrutiny of existing policies.

“The energy policy of Taiwan is just not working at the moment,” he says, adding that “there’s no time to waste” when it comes to improving the power grid. “It’s a strategic issue, military issue, social issue, and economic issue – it ticks every single major box.”

Jason Hsu, a former Taiwan legislator and currently senior research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, stressed at the Brookings seminar that the shortage of semiconductor talent is already noticeable in both the U.S. and Taiwan. The island’s recent establishment of a Semiconductor Research Institute is a step in the right direction, but not enough to fill the gap, he said.

“There needs to be a comprehensive program that links U.S. and Taiwan talent development and ensures that Taiwan can continue to develop its manufacturing capability and talent,” with innovation shared between the U.S. and Taiwan, Hsu noted.

Taiwan has relaxed immigration laws to attract foreign talent, particularly from Southeast Asia, and developed work and study programs for university students, said Minister Without Portfolio John Deng during the Brookings event.

But considering that the island is on track to become a super-aged society, Taiwan could and should implement a much more robust and open immigration policy that attracts more people to make up for the shrinking labor pool. The island’s decreasing population could pose an existential threat to Taiwan if not managed, says Hammond-Chambers.

Meanwhile, Taiwan could take advantage of what some scholars have dubbed “brain circulation” to strengthen economic ties with the U.S., according to Michael Nelson, senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace’s Technology and International Affairs Program.

“A lot of people from Taiwan have studied overseas, and some of them bring that knowledge back to Taiwan and start companies or teach the next generation,” he says, citing the founders of TSMC and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) as two examples. “But a lot of them are still working overseas, and they’re part of this diaspora that forms a built-in advantage for Taiwan.”

Cloud opportunities

As the world undergoes the Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital supply chain technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), algorithms, and machine learning can be used to analyze and learn from big data, which powers intelligent automation and provides supply chain managers with real-time insights that can assist quick responses to disruptions.

“When we think about how to boost our competitiveness, it doesn’t all have to be about manufacturing,” said Meriya Solis, Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. “We need to be mindful of the fact that we’re moving toward a digital economy.”

But while smart tools will mitigate human error, they pose a supply chain risk if they are not backed up by robust cybersecurity systems. Carnegie’s Nelson says that improving cybersecurity and investing in the Cloud of Things – integrated Internet of Things and Cloud Computing technology – would not only benefit biotech and other high-tech industries, but also create more robust supply chains for traditional industries. “It could help us do a better job of tracking fishing ports, ensuring the quality of food, and making sure cold chains are not broken,” he says.

The current global software infrastructure, notes Nelson, is built on a precarious system. Commercial software products tend to rely on complex open-source software repositories, and vulnerability in a single aspect of these repositories could compromise every commercial product that uses it.

Following an increase in cyberattacks, Taiwan’s government declared cybersecurity to be a national security issue in 2018 and proceeded to implement its Cyber Security Management Act in January 2019. The law stipulates obligations for providers of critical infrastructure, including water, energy, ICT production, and financial and healthcare services. The U.S. and Taiwan held their first joint Cyber Offensive and Defense Exercise (CODE), hosted by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Executive Yuan’s Department of Cyber Security, in 2019.

In the past, Chinese tech seemed like it was on a steady path to market domination. But due to a high incidence of poorly written Chinese software and concerns that state actors could impel companies to embed security backdoors into their products, trust in its software is now generally low among global users. Nelson sees a lucrative opportunity for Taiwan to increase its involvement in data supply chains by establishing itself as a trusted source for more secure and better-tested software.

“Through the hardware sector and the semiconductor industry, you have all these links to all the major players,” he says. “By leveraging those links and showing that Taiwan can ensure that the software running on the chips they built is doing the job it’s advertised to do, Taiwan can help integrate different pieces of software from different companies and gain a reputation for being a trusted integrator.”

But to establish such a competitive advantage, Taiwan’s government will need to implement mechanisms that encourage local IT companies to uncover security vulnerabilities and adopt quality verification tools.