The market started worrying about the oversupply in semiconductor 2023, when the demand will start growing again depends on two factors: the situation of the macroeconomy and the inventory status.

Since foundries’ capacity utilization rates started drop in 3Q22, chip supply as a whole has decreased significantly. This, in turn, has helped limit inventory growth across the supply chain. However, the global economy is still at risk of a mild recession, so consumers may allocate more of their spending to daily necessities. They may also spend more on tourism due to easing of the pandemic. This could lead to weak sales for consumer electronic products.

Not to mention that most consumers already purchased the electronic products that they need for working or studying at home during the pandemic. Assuming that the overall inventory level of the supply chain will return to a healthier level, TrendForce believes that chip demand will begin to rebound to a certain extent in 2Q23. Then, the demand growth will become more obvious from 3Q23 onward. Nevertheless, this demand growth may not be too strong due to uncertainties in the global economy.

If we observe the situation from the perspective of the foundry industry, smartphones represent the largest application segment in terms of wafer consumption. The smartphone supply chain started inventory correction earlier, so demand rebound might be more obvious initially for smartphone-related chips compared with chips used in other consumer devices. On the other hand, with different benchmarks, the demand for HPC chips will show more significant growth compared with the demand for smartphone chips.

On December 6, TSMC held a ceremony for the first tool-in of its new Arizona fab. This event came after the foundry giant had publicized a series of overseas expansion projects. Within Taiwan, TSMC’s recent announcements have caused a stir in public opinion. Concerns have been raised about the possibility of a hollowing out of the island’s semiconductor industry due to a mass exodus of professionals involved in chip manufacturing.

TSMC’s Overseas Expansion Plan

TSMC actually embarked on the path to internationalize its business operations much earlier in 2015, when it made the announcement to build a fab in Nanjing, Mainland China. At that time, the chief reason behind this expansion project was that Huawei had become the second most important client next to Apple. Also, TSMC planned to have its 16nm node serve as the main manufacturing technology of the Nanjing fab. This decision was in line with the semiconductor technology export rules enforced by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs. Specifically, domestic chipmakers are only allowed to deploy “n-1” technologies at overseas manufacturing sites. Despite being in compliance with all domestic laws and regulations, TSMC still attracted a lot of controversies with establishing a base of operation in Mainland China, and there were speculations that more advanced semiconductor technologies will be leaving Taiwan with the “westward expansion”.

Fast-forward to present day, China is not the only one that is focusing on the development of a homegrown semiconductor industry. After witnessing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global supply chain, many other countries are reconsidering the importance of semiconductor supply in their own industries. From the US to Japan and European countries, governments have begun to offer various subsidies and market-based incentives in order to entice major semiconductor manufacturers such as TSMC to build fabs in their territories.

A detailed survey of TSMC’s overseas expansion activities from 2015 onwards finds that the construction of the Nanjing fab commenced in 2016 a year after the announcement of the project. The fab then celebrated the formal start of mass production with a ceremony in 2018. Two years later, in 2020, TSMC revealed the plan to build a 12-inch wafer fab that deploys advanced nodes in Arizona. Moving into 2021, the foundry giant unveiled two more expansion projects in Japan. The plan to open a “3D IC material R&D center” in Tsukuba (Ibaraki Prefecture) was announced first. Later in October of that same year, TSMC said it will set up a fab in Kumamoto.

Where Will TSMC Go After US?

Regarding the locations of TSMC’s fabs worldwide, TrendForce’s latest research reveals that for 12-inch wafer foundry, TSMC has four fabs in Taiwan, including including two upcoming greenfield projects respectively located in Hsinchu and Kaohsiung. Outside Taiwan, TSMC has one operational 12-inch wafer fabs in Mainland China and two more under construction in the US and Japan. Besides these existing and planned fabs, a close eye is also being kept on TSMC’s possible expansion into the EU states. Germany has long been rumored to be TSMC’s candidate for setting up a fab in Europe. However, Ireland has a lot of potential as well since Intel previously announced its intention to expand its existing manufacturing operation in this country. Currently, TSMC is internally assessing the feasibility of landing a project in Ireland.

Taiwan Still Has Advantages in Talents, Business Culture, and Complete Industry Ecosystem

Going back to the issue of whether TSMC’s overseas expansion activities will negatively affect Taiwan’s semiconductor industry by causing an outward migration of related professionals or a weakening of the industry’s competitive advantage. According to TrendForce analyst Joanne Chiao, the deglobalization trend is gradually emerging in the supply-demand dynamics of the semiconductor market. Based on the latest data, the geographical distribution of TSMC’s production capacity (that is calculated in thousands of 12-inch wafer equivalents per month) for 2022 is estimated as follows: 93% in Taiwan, about 6% in Mainland China, and 1% in the US. The short-term effects of TSMC’s overseas projects will thus be very limited as the majority share of the foundry’s production capacity is going to stay in Taiwan.

As for the effects on the competitiveness of the domestic semiconductor industry in the long run, Chiao believes that deglobalization will lead to a general rise in operating costs for foundries worldwide. This means that every foundry will be facing increasing pressure related to pricing regardless of where they put their fabs. On the other hand, Taiwan’s importance as the world’s main chip production base will diminish somewhat over time because of the deglobalization trend.

Nevertheless, the foundry industry depends on tight relations with clients as well as highly synchronized and meticulous services among all participants across the supply chain. This is where Taiwan shines because the island is home to a complete ecosystem for the foundry industry. All participants in this ecosystem advance together when it comes to upgrading technological capabilities or overcoming technological bottlenecks. Apart from these advantages, a system of management has been well established on the island for the various aspects of fab operation. As foundries keep their fabs running 24/7, they are constantly tested in manpower scheduling. Therefore, they have to rely on locally cultivated talents and local experience that have taken decades to amass. In other words, fabs in Taiwan are performing at the highest level because of the local business and work culture.

（Image credit: TSMC Linkedin）

The government of Taiwan is preparing to launch its version of “the CHIPS Act” to support locally operating companies that develop innovative technologies and have a crucial spot within the global supply chain. A highlight of this legislation is a tax credit scheme: a maximum of 25% for R&D in “forward-looking technologies” and another 5% for investments in advanced manufacturing equipment.

According to the draft of this proposed legislation, companies that play an important role in the global supply chain and engage in technological innovation within the jurisdiction of Taiwan (the Republic of China) are eligible for the aforementioned tax credits if they also meet certain other conditions. As for the limit of the two tax credits, neither one of them can exceed 30% of the business income tax for the current year. Together, they cannot exceed 50% of the same annual business income tax.

Companies that will be applying for the tax credits must meet three general conditions. First, applicants must pay an effective tax rate of at least 15% in accordance with OECD’s minimum tax rules for multinationals. Second, applicants must reach a certain scale for the ratio of R&D spending to revenue (R&D intensity) and equipment-related investments. The minimum thresholds for the R&D intensity and equipment-related investments have yet to be determined and will likely be set within the subsections of the legislation later on. Lastly, applicants must not have incurred a major regulatory violation concerning environmental protection, labor protection, food and drug safety, etc. in the past three years.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs stated in a recent announcement that the island’s industries are deeply enmeshed within the global supply chain. They thus have become the backbone of the global economy and international commerce on account of their “uniqueness” and “irreplaceability”. The ministry added that local industries will have to adapt to the changing landscape of cooperation and competition in order to retain their indispensable role.

The ministry also commented that in the wake of a series of major events that have disrupted the operation of the global supply chain, many countries have initiated industry development policies that seek to improve the resiliency of their key economic sectors and strengthen their national security. These policies tend to emphasize the followings: (1) the formation of an autonomous and stable domestic supply chain; (2) the need to achieve dominance in next-generation technologies; and (3) the provisioning of large subsidies and tax incentives so as to raise domestic production and attract investments from multinationals. The ministry further asserted that as international competition gets fiercer, Taiwan must retain its existing advantages while finding other ways to further consolidate and enhance the positions of its key industries in the global supply chain. Therefore, the government finds it necessary to provide new tax incentives to support this kind of development.

According to TrendForce, Taiwan is crucial to the global semiconductor supply chain, accounting for a 26% market share of semiconductor revenue in 2021, ranking second in the world. Its IC design and packaging & testing industries also account for a 27% and 20% global market share, ranking second and first in the world, respectively. Firmly in the pole position, Taiwan accounts for 64% of the foundry market. In addition to TSMC possessing the most advanced process technology at this stage, foundries including UMC, Vanguard, and PSMC also have their own process advantages. Under the looming shadow of chip shortages caused by the pandemic and geopolitical turmoil in the past two years, various governments have quickly awakened to the fact that localization of chip manufacturing is necessary to avoid being cut off from chip acquisition due to logistics difficulties or cross-border shipment bans. Taiwanese companies have ridden this wave to become partners that governments around the world are eager to invite to set up factories in various locales.

Currently, 8-inch and 12-inch foundries are dominated by 24 fabs in Taiwan, followed by China, South Korea, and the United States. Looking at new factories plans post 2021, Taiwan still accounts for the largest number of new fabs, including six new plants in progress, followed in activity by China and the United States, with plans for four and three new fabs, respectively. Due to the advantages and uniqueness of Taiwanese fabs in terms of advanced processes and certain special processes, they accepted invitations to set up plants in various countries, unlike non-Taiwanese foundries who largely still build fabs locally. Therefore, Taiwanese manufacturers have successively announced factory expansions at locations including the United States, China, Japan, and Singapore in addition to Taiwan in consideration of local client needs and technical cooperation.

The focus of Taiwan’s key technologies and production expansion remains in Taiwan, accounting for 44% of global wafer production capacity by 2025

In 2022, Taiwan will account for approximately 48% of global 12-inch equivalent wafer foundry production capacity. Only looking at 12-inch wafer production capacity with more than 50% market share, the market share of advanced processes below 16nm (inclusive) will be as high as 61%. However, as Taiwanese manufacturers expand their production globally, TrendForce estimates that the market share held by Taiwan’s local foundry capacity will drop slightly to 44% in 2025, of which the market share of 12-inch wafer capacity will fall to 47% and advanced manufacturing processes to approximately 58%. However, Taiwanese foundries’ recent production expansion plans remain focused on Taiwan including TSMC’s most advanced N3 and N2 nodes, while companies such as UMC, Vanguard, and PSMC retain several new factory projects in Hsinchu, Miaoli, and Tainan.

TrendForce believes, since Taiwanese foundries have announced plans to build fabs in China, the United States, Japan, and Singapore, and foundries in numerous countries are also actively expanding production, Taiwan’s market share of foundry capacity will drop slightly in 2025. However, semiconductor enclaves do not come together quickly. The integrity of a supply chain relies on the synergy among upstream (raw materials, equipment, and wafers), midstream (IP design services, IC design, manufacturing, and packaging and testing), and downstream (brands and distributors) sectors. Taiwan has advantages in talent, geographical convenience and industrial enclaves. Therefore, Taiwanese foundries still tend to focus on Taiwan for R&D and production expansion. Looking at the existing blueprint for production expansion, Taiwan will still control 44% of the world’s foundry capacity by 2025 and as much as 58% of the world’s capacity for advanced processes, continuing its dominance of the global semiconductor industry.

(AmCham Taiwan｜Associate Editor: Julia Bergström) As more countries look to diversify their supply chains, Taiwan has a chance to strengthen its position in the global economy. But is its infrastructure robust enough to support expanded business?

Over the past few years, the U.S. and Taiwan have intensified their efforts to reduce reliance on China in their supply chains as a way to increase resilience. First came the U.S.-China trade dispute, in which American companies were encouraged to leave or decrease operations in China, followed by the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s reshoring initiative to bring investment from China back to Taiwan.

At the onset of the global pandemic, the flow of critical products halted, global supply chains were disrupted, and supply chain resilience became a priority for all industries. Then, just as commerce began to bounce back, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine, giving rise to new worries of geopolitically induced shortages and inflationary effects.

Meanwhile, China is pushing to indigenize its supply chains, most notably with its Made in China 2025 plan, which aims to upgrade Chinese industries’ manufacturing capabilities into more technology-intensive powerhouses and achieve independence from foreign suppliers.

Although the U.S. and Taiwan are not decoupling from China, they have significantly changed the flow of goods and investments, says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, managing director of BowerGroupAsia, a consultancy.

“Instead of 10 dollars flowing into China, you’re seeing five going to China and the other five to the Southeast Asia region, or even Taiwan,” he says. However, there is no certainty that Taiwan will gain some of China’s lost business. Rather, achieving that goal will require significant policy changes and government efforts.

For Taiwan, strengthening its role in global supply chains is more than an effort to ensure economic stability – it also has political and security implications. Hammond-Chambers sees Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor industry in particular as a “geostrategic lever that focuses other countries on the importance of Taiwan and peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.”

Taiwan accounts for over 60% of the global chip foundry market, and the island plays a pivotal role in many high-tech industries, a trend expected to continue despite pushes from the U.S. and EU to revitalize their semiconductor industries.

In fact, says Joanne Chiao, senior analyst at Taiwanese market research firm TrendForce, her organization “expects Taiwan’s market share [in the chip foundry sector] will further increase to 66% in 2022,” as some of the newly added capacity will enter mass production by the end of 2022.

Although Taiwan leads in semiconductors, domestic expansion has its limits. During a discussion on Taiwan’s role in global supply chains organized by Washington, D.C.-based public policy organization The Brookings Institution, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) Vice President of Global Government Affairs Peter Cleveland noted that the company operates “at such a massive scale that it’s mind-blowing to people. [Production] takes over 4 million gallons of water per day, the power requirements are enormous, and STEM talent is critical.”

Cleveland said he sees geographic dispersion as an advantage for the company, and the expansion of Taiwan semiconductor operations in the U.S. as a way to strengthen supply chains while alleviating chip manufacturing’s strain on Taiwan’s resources. TSMC is constructing a US$12 billion fab in Phoenix, Arizona, which is scheduled to start producing chips in 2024. It is also building a plant in Japan and is in early discussions regarding a possible fab in Germany.

Apart from expanding manufacturing abroad, Taiwan also needs to implement policies that strengthen its infrastructure, according to BowerGroupAsia’s Hammond-Chambers. Of what has been termed the island’s “five shortages” (land, power, water, labor, and talent), he refers to labor, talent, and electricity as the most critical areas for government scrutiny of existing policies.

“The energy policy of Taiwan is just not working at the moment,” he says, adding that “there’s no time to waste” when it comes to improving the power grid. “It’s a strategic issue, military issue, social issue, and economic issue – it ticks every single major box.”

Jason Hsu, a former Taiwan legislator and currently senior research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, stressed at the Brookings seminar that the shortage of semiconductor talent is already noticeable in both the U.S. and Taiwan. The island’s recent establishment of a Semiconductor Research Institute is a step in the right direction, but not enough to fill the gap, he said.

“There needs to be a comprehensive program that links U.S. and Taiwan talent development and ensures that Taiwan can continue to develop its manufacturing capability and talent,” with innovation shared between the U.S. and Taiwan, Hsu noted.

Taiwan has relaxed immigration laws to attract foreign talent, particularly from Southeast Asia, and developed work and study programs for university students, said Minister Without Portfolio John Deng during the Brookings event.

But considering that the island is on track to become a super-aged society, Taiwan could and should implement a much more robust and open immigration policy that attracts more people to make up for the shrinking labor pool. The island’s decreasing population could pose an existential threat to Taiwan if not managed, says Hammond-Chambers.

Meanwhile, Taiwan could take advantage of what some scholars have dubbed “brain circulation” to strengthen economic ties with the U.S., according to Michael Nelson, senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace’s Technology and International Affairs Program.

“A lot of people from Taiwan have studied overseas, and some of them bring that knowledge back to Taiwan and start companies or teach the next generation,” he says, citing the founders of TSMC and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) as two examples. “But a lot of them are still working overseas, and they’re part of this diaspora that forms a built-in advantage for Taiwan.”

Cloud opportunities

As the world undergoes the Fourth Industrial Revolution, digital supply chain technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), algorithms, and machine learning can be used to analyze and learn from big data, which powers intelligent automation and provides supply chain managers with real-time insights that can assist quick responses to disruptions.

“When we think about how to boost our competitiveness, it doesn’t all have to be about manufacturing,” said Meriya Solis, Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. “We need to be mindful of the fact that we’re moving toward a digital economy.”

But while smart tools will mitigate human error, they pose a supply chain risk if they are not backed up by robust cybersecurity systems. Carnegie’s Nelson says that improving cybersecurity and investing in the Cloud of Things – integrated Internet of Things and Cloud Computing technology – would not only benefit biotech and other high-tech industries, but also create more robust supply chains for traditional industries. “It could help us do a better job of tracking fishing ports, ensuring the quality of food, and making sure cold chains are not broken,” he says.

The current global software infrastructure, notes Nelson, is built on a precarious system. Commercial software products tend to rely on complex open-source software repositories, and vulnerability in a single aspect of these repositories could compromise every commercial product that uses it.

Following an increase in cyberattacks, Taiwan’s government declared cybersecurity to be a national security issue in 2018 and proceeded to implement its Cyber Security Management Act in January 2019. The law stipulates obligations for providers of critical infrastructure, including water, energy, ICT production, and financial and healthcare services. The U.S. and Taiwan held their first joint Cyber Offensive and Defense Exercise (CODE), hosted by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Executive Yuan’s Department of Cyber Security, in 2019.

In the past, Chinese tech seemed like it was on a steady path to market domination. But due to a high incidence of poorly written Chinese software and concerns that state actors could impel companies to embed security backdoors into their products, trust in its software is now generally low among global users. Nelson sees a lucrative opportunity for Taiwan to increase its involvement in data supply chains by establishing itself as a trusted source for more secure and better-tested software.

“Through the hardware sector and the semiconductor industry, you have all these links to all the major players,” he says. “By leveraging those links and showing that Taiwan can ensure that the software running on the chips they built is doing the job it’s advertised to do, Taiwan can help integrate different pieces of software from different companies and gain a reputation for being a trusted integrator.”

But to establish such a competitive advantage, Taiwan’s government will need to implement mechanisms that encourage local IT companies to uncover security vulnerabilities and adopt quality verification tools.